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Abstract The article takes the renewed popularity and interest in epidemiologi-
cal modelling for Covid-19 as a point of departure to ask how modelling has his-
torically shaped epidemiological reasoning. The focus lies on a particular model, 
developed in the late 1920s through a collaboration of the former field-epidemiol-
ogists and medical officer, Wade Hampton Frost, and the biostatistician and popu-
lation ecologist Lowell Reed. Other than former approaches to epidemic theory in 
mathematical formula, the Reed-Frost epidemic theory was materialised in a simple 
mechanical analogue: a box with coloured marbles and a wooden trough. The article 
reconstructs how the introduction of this mechanical model has reshaped epidemio-
logical reasoning by shifting the field from purely descriptive to analytical practices. 
It was not incidental that the history of this model coincided with the foundation 
of epidemiology as an academic discipline, as it valorised and institutionalised new 
theoretical contributions to the field. Through its versatility, the model shifted the 
field’s focus from mono-causal explanations informed by bacteriology, eugenics or 
sanitary perspectives towards the systematic consideration of epidemics as a set of 
interdependent and dynamic variables.
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1 Introduction
Much of the political response to COVID-19 in the UK—and in many other 
places—has rested on inferences derived from mathematical models. Projections, 
predictions and assumptions about the pandemic were made using models which 
assumed new prominence in public perceptions of disruptive science-led govern-
ment policy. Modelled “projections enact a sense of control through evidencing,” 
(Rhodes et al., 2020) particularly in lieu of reliable empirical data and epistemic 
uncertainties (Daston, 2020). Models are not neutral, but have been accused to 
perpetuate their “built-in biopolitical assumptions”, which in turn reinforce con-
cepts of herd-immunity (Hinchcliffe, 2020) or suggest interventions such as lock-
downs (Caduff, 2020). This new prominence given to models as political tools in 
public life, as well as objects of civic concern might be attributed to the need for 
rapid decision-making within the uncertainties of pandemic disruption. However, 
ours is also a moment in which a long-nurtured and well-developed epistemic 
authority of modelling in epidemiological reasoning has become starkly visible. 
Models are not a new working object among epidemiologists and they have been 
used throughout most of the twentieth century to create, investigate, explore and 
teach controlled, simplified simulacra of the worlds of infectious diseases. The 
epistemic authority of modelling, as this article will demonstrate, sits indeed at 
the heart of the history of how epidemics were made complex and how in turn 
they gave rise to an academic and analytic form of epidemiological reasoning.
The sudden proliferation of models during the epidemiological urgency of 
COVID-19 has raised questions about validity, accuracy and reliability of infer-
ences derived from modelling in pandemic policy. These questions are not new, 
and a rich literature on models and modelling has long grappled with the role of 
mathematical predictions in public health. Models have been shown to promote 
interdisciplinary frameworks as they are not contained by any single discipline 
(Morgan, 2012). Modelling substantiates a style of epidemiological practice, as 
Erika Mansnerus argues, that successfully incorporates interdependent factors, 
indicators and assumptions, such as the number of contacts of an individual, the 
probability of transmission or the likelihood of pre-existing immunity in exposed 
individuals (Mansnerus, 2015, p. 13). When transferred from the epidemiologi-
cal research environment to inform policy, models combine disparate factors 
into a coherent story, shaping the chaos of a pandemic into an actionable entity 
(Opitz, 2017). Models not only simulate epidemics, but assume epistemic weight 
precisely through their performative capacity as “generative machines” (Bauer, 
2013) to render epidemics into objects of knowledge that can be newly responded 
to and intervened in.
This article turns to the history of infectious disease modelling to ask what 
we might take away from the historical conditions under which models first 
became the workbenches of epidemiological theorizing. I focus on one particular 
example, developed in the 1920s and often referred to as the “Reed-Frost epi-
demic theory,” designed by the biostatistician Lowell Reed and the epidemiolo-
gists Wade Hampton Frost at Johns Hopkins University. As a set of mathematical 
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assumptions about the changing ratio of susceptible and immune individuals in 
a population, the theory had much in common with earlier attempts of formal-
izing the dynamics of an epidemic. William Farr had famously plotted curves of 
smallpox outbreaks in the late nineteenth century; PD En’Ko in Russia arrived 
at a model in the 1890s, which could be fitted well to measles outbreaks, John 
Brownlee had approached the theory of epidemics through statistical studies of 
immunity, Hilda Hudson and Ronald Ross had already presented their calcula-
tions of an "a priori pathometry" in 1916 to the Royal Society in London, and 
Herbert Soper sought mathematical explanations for the periodicity of epidemic 
curves (Brownlee, 1906; Dietz, 1988; Flexner, 1922; Heesterbeek, 2005; Ross, 
1916; Ross & Hudson, 1917; Soper, 1929). What sets the Reed-Frost theory 
apart, and what is likely also the reason it has been largely overlooked in the rel-
evant historiography, is its materiality as an object. The model was designed and 
predominantly used as a “mechanical analogue,” (Fine, 1977) a dynamic model 
constructed out of an angled trough and a box of colored marbles, with which the 
dynamics of infectious diseases were visualized and taught.
The model’s materiality coupled with its status as a pedagogical instrument, I 
argue here, had decisive impact on how epidemics were newly theorized at the time. 
The mechanical form of this models is one, perhaps the crucial condition, to under-
stand the emergent success of infectious disease modelling in the 1920s. The Reed-
Frost epidemic theory asserted influence because it belonged to the kind of objects 
“that people grasped with their hands” (Chadarevian & Hopwood, 2004, p. 2) as it 
embodied and displayed a novel theoretical approach to teaching the dynamics of 
infectious diseases. Its novelty did, however, not only derive from its capacity to 
illustrate generalisable aspects in three dimensions. Comparable to physical mod-
els in economics or chemistry, its material structure also afforded a shift in theoriz-
ing (Morgan & Boumans, 2004). Where most contemporaneous formulas had been 
overly concerned with the calculation of populations ratios, this mechanical model 
moved the analytical focus to the question of “adequate contact” (Abbey, 1952), 
theorizing the problem of multiple and interdependent causation in epidemiological 
reasoning.
The following historical reconstruction of the mechanical analogue to the Reed-
Frost epidemic theory will bring two historical aspects to bear on the present pro-
liferation of covid-19 modelling. First, Reed and Frost’s mechanistic model is 
introduced as a significant and widely overlooked ancestor to the pervasive SIR 
modelling conventions in contemporary epidemiology.1 The astonishing versatil-
ity and resounding success of this original mechanistic model might be subject of 
anecdotal knowledge among some epidemiologist and infectious disease model-
lers (Lessler & Cummings, 2016; Merrell, 1976; Sartwell, 1976). However, I argue 
here that its historical position within the wider field of epidemiological reasoning 
1 The SIR model is perhaps the most common compartmental modelling technique in contemporary 
infectious disease epidemiology. The letters describe the numbers of individuals who are either suscepti-
ble, infected or recovered and the model is widely referred to as the standard model for differential equa-
tions that seek to describe the dynamics of infectious diseases. (Lessler and Cummings 2016)
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remains still underestimated. The theoretical intervention embodied in the Reed-
Frost model enabled epidemiologists to conceive of all kinds of epidemics—includ-
ing of chronic diseases—as the effect of a multitude of causal factors. Models and 
the pedagogy of mechanistic modelling thus anticipated the “web of causation” that 
Brian MacMahon and Thomas Pugh introduced into epidemiology textbooks in 
1971 (MacMahon & Pugh, 1971). Second, as a novel “working object” (Daston & 
Galison, 1992), models furnished epidemiology with a new analytical practice to 
sharpen its academic profile as a budding discipline. The collaboration of Reed and 
Frost integrated medical and bacteriological knowledge with approaches from popu-
lation ecology, vital statistics, chemistry and natural history. In the combination of 
these perspectives, epidemics appeared no longer as simple mass effects of disease. 
Models offered their exploration and experimentation “sui generis” (Amsterdamska, 
2005, p. 31), and framed them as phenomena that “arise from within” rather than to 
emerge de novo (Mendelsohn, 1998, p. 306).
Instead of following these theoretical and analytical trajectories over the second 
half of the twentieth century to the present—this will need to be subject of follow-on 
work—this article reconstructs some of the aspects with which the Reed-Frost epi-
demic theory secured its defining place in this history. The first section turns to the 
Reed-Frost epidemic theory itself to explore its deterministic mathematical notation 
as a differential equation. While the trajectory of modelling might not be representa-
tive for the wider field of epidemiology, particularly as its post-war focus shifted 
to non-communicable disease, this history holds significance for the development 
of an analytical tradition in the wider field. In the second section, I argue therefore 
that the rigidity of mathematical formalisation collided with the empirical virtues of 
Frost’s epidemiology and the dynamism of Reed’s population ecology and that the 
development of a mechanistic model dovetailed with their endeavour of establishing 
epidemiology as academic and analytical discipline. In the third section, I revisit the 
affordances of the box, trough and marbles to ask how this mechanical model shifted 
the focus of epidemiological considerations away from either bacteriological viru-
lence or the susceptibility of host populations to enable instead a novel theorisation 
of “adequate contact” as function of epidemic dynamics.
2  The Reed‑Frost epidemic theory
Please do not apply too liberal any formulation of a law of epidemic. Such a 
simple scheme, as was given to illustrate the effect of mass-immunization, may 
be useful and in a sense correct—as indicating the kind of interplay—but must 
be taken only for what it is—and this applies very generally to rigid formaliza-
tions—they are diagrams rather than photographic reproductions.2
2 Frost, W.H. (1931), Frost Lecture on Epidemic Theory 1930, March  9th, 1931, Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Archives, Wade Hampton Frost Papers, Box 60.
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These words of warning were raised by Frost in the introduction to his lecture 
series Epidemic Theory III at Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene in the 1930s. The 
students—most likely studying public health—had just witnessed a "simple scheme" 
with which Frost visualized how the manipulation of an epidemic curve could be 
achieved through basic arithmetic steps. After a lengthy prologue on the complex 
interactions between hosts, pathogens and the environment, which epidemiologists 
had to grapple with when trying to understand the waxing and waning of an epi-
demic, Frost introduced a mechanical model to his students. In the lecture-hall, he 
used an angled trough and a box with approximately one hundred coloured mar-
bles to demonstrate the essential dynamics of an epidemic. To simulate an outbreak, 
marbles were poured into the angled trough in a single file. The resulting colour 
pattern determined the ratio of infected, susceptible, and recovered individuals for 
a given time period. Before the marbles were returned to the box, infected were 
replaced with recovered marbles and susceptible marbles lying next to infected mar-
bles became infected. Then, after randomization in the box, the next time period was 
poured into the trough.
This model, which Frost declared "useful and in a sense correct," simulated the 
probable series of events following from the introduction of an infectious agent into 
a fixed population of susceptible individuals within a confined space. The simple 
scheme exemplified "the kind of interplay" that was thought to govern an epidemic’s 
dynamic and emphasised possible effects of interventions used to alter the predicted 
course of an epidemic. The box as randomizer guaranteed a probabilistic dimension 
of the model, while the trough stood in for societal and environmental structures in 
which transmission might occur. These mechanical structures did not just serve the 
purpose of illustration and exemplification, but they did set the model apart from the 
formula it was based on.
In its written form, the Reed-Frost epidemic theory emerged as a deterministic 
formula, void of any randomness or probabilistic devices. The parameters of its 
algebraic expression were simple: the theory made no assumptions about the natu-
ral history of the disease, nor did it qualify the pathogen, the host and its environ-
ment.3 All infected individuals will be infectious to susceptible individuals within a 
time-bound period, while infected individuals will go on to develop immunity to the 
infection in the same period. Each individual has a fixed probability of coming into 
contact with other individuals within one time interval—a concept Reed and Frost 
had integrated from Soper’s work with reference to chemical laws of mass-action.4 
Set up in this way, the theory was strictly deterministic, as all variables within such 
a model epidemic were determined by the model’s logic. While the formula might 
be understood as a reasonable description "of the processes underlying outbreaks of 
3 As neither Reed or Frost provided much of an explanation on the mathematical definitions of their 
model, this and the following inferences follow Helen Abbey’s interpretation of the mathematical theory 
of Reed and Frost (Abbey 1952).
4 The law of mass action was derived from the observation in chemistry concerning the role of reactants 
in equilibrium systems. Translated to epidemiology and ecology, Heesterbeck argues that it “roughly 
states that the rate at which individuals of two types, X and Y, meet is proportional to the product of the 
(spatial) densities of the respective subpopulations.” (Heesterbeek 2005)
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acute infections within institutions (e.g. measles within high schools),” (Fine, 1977, 
p. 88) the deterministic theory was designed for mathematical clarity rather than to 
illuminate the dynamics of epidemics.
The mathematical notation can be written out as the following differential equa-
tion:  St and  Ct are taken to be the numbers of susceptible individuals (S) and cases 
(C) during a time interval (t). Contact is noted as the probability (p), which assumes 
that a susceptible individual will come into contact with at least one case during a 
time period [p = (1−q)]. To predict the number of cases in an epidemic, the deter-
ministic theory is mathematically expressed as follows:  Ct + 1 =  St(1−qCt). The 
increasing number of cases in a time period (t + 1) is equal to the number of suscep-
tible individuals divided by the probability for contact in that time period. This then 
gives an equation to express the withering of susceptible individuals in the same epi-
demic, with the assumption of acquired immunity:  St + 1 =  St—Ct + 1. The shrinking 
number of S is equal to the given number of susceptible individuals, subtracting the 
Fig. 1.  Graph of an epidemic curve according to the deterministic notation of the Reed-Frost epidemic 
theory. Here, one case was introduced into a population of 100 susceptible marbles. It was assumed that 
each individual had contact with two others during a time, with the graph in effect showing the develop-
ment of the case numbers as well as the resulting number of remaining susceptible individuals in a popu-
lation. Drawn after the original (Frost, 1976), with permission from Oxford University Press
1 3
A box, a trough and marbles: How the Reed‑Frost epidemic theory… Page 7 of 24   105 
number of cases growing over time. These two equations allow for a prediction and 
diagrammatic visualization of a simple theoretical epidemic. As the editor of the 
American Journal of Epidemiology visualized in a diagram in 1977, this determin-
istic model would always yield to the same curve, as all of its variables were ulti-
mately determined by the model’s configuration (see Fig. 1).
However, to make the model into a useful pedagogical instrument it needed to 
integrate a stochastic element by randomizing the numbers of susceptible individu-
als who could become infected. The notation gets reasonably complicated, and it 
might have been for that very reason that Reed and Frost decided in the late 1920s 
to build a mechanical model to demonstrate the stochastic version of their theory. 
The mechanical device consisted of marbles of four different colours in a trough: 
susceptible (S) were green, infected cases (C) were red, immune (I) were blue and 
blocks, or "contact neutralizers" (N), were white. Shaking the container with the 
marbles randomized the population after which they were poured into the trough 
in single file. In this row, individuals not separated by neutralizers were considered 
to have made sufficient contact, and susceptible marbles adjacent to infected mar-
bles were now considered infected. This population of marbles was recorded, and 
susceptible marbles were replaced by infected marbles, while infected marbles were 
replaced by immune marbles. After randomization, the procedure was repeated until 
the epidemic expired. Multiple experiments with the same marbles led to different 
epidemic curves, as an element of chance now governed the model’s expression. 
Some iterations would immediately stall without any infection occurring, while oth-
ers would closely follow the standard epidemic curves derived from the determin-
istic model. The model was versatile and allowed for experimental manipulations, 
as Fine emphasized in his appraisal. Immunization programs could be simulated by 
increasing the number of immunized marbles, multiple infections could be intro-
duced to manipulate the curve and the amount of neutralizers (N) enabled the simu-
lation of different rates of contact (see Fig. 2).
Archival sources reveal little with regards to any explicit considerations, which 
might have guided Reed’s and Frost’s thinking when designing the model. In his lec-
tures, and on occasion elsewhere, Frost was a vocal sceptic about inferences made 
from schemes or models and then applied to real world epidemics. He asked his 
students to “note that any theory of epidemics which is sufficiently rigid and definite 
to be expressible in a mathematical statement is in all probability too rigid to be 
an exact representation of the phenomenon.”5 He wanted to make sure the model 
was not mistaken for a representation of an epidemic, nor did he expect his model 
to reveal new methods for forecasting or intervention. Importantly, to Frost, their 
model was not an instrument of prediction with which epidemiological research was 
to be elevated from painstaking work on the ground, in homes and communities 
affected by poliomyelitis, cholera or influenza. Instead, the model was for Frost an 
instrument to study the underlying dynamics of infectious diseases and to illustrate 
how interventions might impact outcomes.
5 Frost, W.H. (1931), Frost Lecture on Epidemic Theory 1930, March  9th, 1931, Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Archives, Wade Hampton Frost Papers, Box 60.
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Intriguingly, Frost had used the metaphor of a photograph to be entrusted with 
the representation of the complex event of a real epidemic. Only the mechanical 
reproduction of the framed picture could capture the varying shades of environmen-
tal conditions and the plethora of detail in which each case of infection has its own 
idiosyncratic coordinates and story. Only the camera could, to invoke Frost’s con-
temporary Walter Benjamin, afford a sense of "the immense and unexpected field of 
action" (Benjamin, 1969, p. 236) that any event, and perhaps even more so, any epi-
demic crisis brought. The diagram, compared to the photograph, conveyed a set of 
previously considered relations to communicate a simplified illustration of selected 
components from the natural world: here, questions of relations, directions, and iter-




















Fig. 2  Graph to demonstrate the results of three epidemic simulations with the trough, box and marbles. 
Again, a single case was introduced into a population of 100 susceptible marbles. With one simulation 
to lead to only one case (……), the others lead to 73 (----) and 84 cases (–––). Drawn after the original 
(Fine, 1977), with permission from Oxford University Press
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comparison, Frost reinforced the well-established separation between empirical and 
theoretical work, between observation in epidemic-stricken locales and scholars’ 
work with models, paper technologies and tools, diagrams and equations (Kaiser, 
2009; Klein, 2003; MacKenzie, 2018; Morgan, 2012). The model, Reed and Frost 
had developed, was supposed to exemplify the relations and connections that seem 
to structure outbreaks, but it should not replace nor question the value of empirical 
observation.
Importantly, the Reed-Frost model was designed as a teaching instrument and 
neither Reed nor Frost considered a dedicated publication of the model and its 
underlying theory to be of any value. Frost offered an outline of the model’s reason-
ing in a 1928 lecture at Harvard, which was published posthumously in 1976. In the 
lecture, which offers some key considerations guiding Frost’s scientific approach to 
epidemiology, he contemplated the possibility of fitting epidemiological knowledge 
into general theories, which could be made vivid in the classroom through mechani-
cal models (Frost, 1976, p. 142). In line with this pedagogical reasoning, the Reed-
Frost model was a useful, and perhaps particularly successful instrument to teach 
fundamental principles of their epidemiological theory. "It might even be argued," 
Fine suggests in his review of the Reed-Frost model, that it was through classroom 
teaching "that models have had their greatest impact upon the practice of epidemiol-
ogy today." (Fine, 1977, p. 87)
Only after the model had developed a life of its own, being used by other epide-
miologists, replicated, and celebrated in epidemiological lectures across the US and 
in the UK, Reed expounded on its purpose and value explicitly (Frost had already 
died in 1938). In 1951, Reed presented a segment for the TV production "The Johns 
Hopkins Science Review", in which he explained to a public audience the mer-
its of epidemic theory with his model. By 1951 Reed had placed the model at the 
heart of how he conceived of the scientific method in epidemiological research. He 
described and demonstrated how the marbles rolling down the trough is the “work-
bench of the epidemiologist’s laboratory,” and called the mechanical construction 
“a critical instrument for experimental epidemiological science.”6 To emphasize the 
field’s value to the public, and to underline the rigor with which epidemiology pur-
sued the protection of the nation’s health, Reed used the model to demonstrate what 
epidemiological scientists really do when they do epidemiology (See Fig. 3).
The models functions, its mechanical construction, the combination of the proba-
bilistic box with the linear trough and the seriality of time-periods implied by its 
usage were supposed to reshape how causes were conceptualised, while shifting the 
analytical focus to the multiple conditions under which the dynamics of an outbreak 
unfold. In this way, Reed and Frost’s model was perhaps supposed to do for epide-
miology what Feynman’s infamous diagram had done for theoretical physics. As a 
drastic simplification of complex and lengthy calculations, Feynman’s diagrams had 
been dispersed, were used in classrooms, lecture halls and seminars, while being 
6 The segment had been broadcasted on 17 April 1951, “Epidemic theory—what is it?”, Johns Hopkins 
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re-drawn, re-used and re-interpreted in pedagogical settings. In Kaiser’s interpreta-
tion of these diagrams as important paper tools for the theoretical practice in phys-
ics, they do not—as Latour would argue—appear as instruments of cohesion, con-
sistency and immutability (Latour, 1990), but were subject to unfolding variations in 
their representation, in their application and in their interpretation (Kaiser, 2009, p. 
7). Similar to these diagrams, Reed and Frost’s model lent itself to dismantle causal 
concepts, prevalent in epidemiological thinking and it was the mutability of the 
model, that allowed it to shape theoretical foundations for epidemiology’s elevation 
into the realms of academic disciplines.
3  Disciplining epidemiology
In 1919, when Frost took up the chair of the world’s first dedicated department 
of epidemiology, the field was structured by extensive discussions about its novel 
shape as an academic discipline. From the outset, Frost acknowledged that the field 
was only "provisionally defined" and its shape "has not been covered in a system-
atic manner."7 Epidemiological chairs had been established in medical schools 
elsewhere, while epidemiological societies and clubs had advanced epidemiologi-
cal thinking in a more or less institutionalized way, particularly in the UK (Amster-
damska, 2005; Magnello & Hardy, 2002; Steere-Williams, 2020). But setting up the 
Fig. 3  Still from “The Johns Hopkins Science Review” about the Reed-Frost epidemic theory from 
1951. Here, Lowell Reed demonstrates the model’s use, pouring marbles into the trough to simulate a 
time period of an epidemic. “Epidemic theory—what is it?,” Johns Hopkins Television Programs 1948–
1960, Special Collections Milton S. Eisenhower Library, The Johns Hopkins University. With permission 
from Special Collections of the Milton Eisenhower Library at Johns Hopkins University
7 Frost, W.H. (1920), Frost’s outline for Organization of a Department of Epidemiology, 1920, Johns 
Hopkins University Archives, Wade Hampton Frost Papers, Box 7.
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department of epidemiology at the Hopkins School for Hygiene required a system-
atic consideration of the field to vouch for its unique scientific contribution and to 
demarcate its institutional relationship to the existing academic landscape.
In his new position as head of department, Frost sought to establish an empirical 
research field dedicated to the “study of infectious disease in nature.”(Frost, 1941, 
p. 504) Particularly the study of infections without signs of disease or illness, Frost 
wrote in 1928, was supposed to "prepare our minds for clearer interpretations of the 
more obscure epidemiology of other diseases."(Frost, 1976, p. 144) In parallel, Frost 
sought to set his epidemiological research on firm, but novel scientific grounds. His 
teaching and lectures were regularly prefaced with a friendly reminder about the first 
principles of epidemiology as a positive science. With reference to Karl Pearson, he 
defined epidemiological research as dedicated to "the classification of facts, the rec-
ognition of their sequence and relative significance, and the habit of forming a judg-
ment upon these facts unbiased by personal feeling."8 He invoked Pierre-Eugène-
Marcellin Berthelot to remind students that the purpose of such a science was to 
establish facts and put them into immediate relations, rather than to invest in the 
understanding of a cause or end. The methods Frost taught, and the laboratory stud-
ies he led, were exercises in problem-led collection, analysis and communication 
of data. According to his students, Frost’s was an "example of painstaking, system-
atic and scholarly approach to problems."(Sartwell, 1976) However, as epidemiol-
ogy was “never, in fact, developed, as a purely descriptive science,” but rather an 
endeavour to enable a novel understanding of disease, its distribution, and control, it 
would require “a theory or philosophy of disease.”(Frost, 1941, p. 497) The question 
was, how this theoretical work would set epidemiology on discrete and sufficiently 
unique grounds.
Fee characterized Frost’s agenda as an attempt to craft a field of applied public 
health science. Exemplified by Frost’s own biography as a field epidemiologist, this 
was an effort to maintain a practice of epidemiology based in experience, which 
could be useful to medical officers in their field investigations, while still enabling 
"theoretical development."(Fee, 2016, p. 133) Frost himself defined the purpose 
of the new department with three distinct goals: first, students were to learn about 
"certain fundamental principles governing the occurrence of infectious diseases"; 
second, they would become familiar with "the special methods applicable to study 
in this field"; and third, they should understand how to apply these principles and 
methods to "public health administration."9
In line with these pedagogic principles, Frost’s teaching method focused on case 
studies. The department’s portfolio included lecturing on the diagnosis of discrete 
epidemics using data from historical events, the alignment of experimental data with 
knowledge about aetiologies of infectious diseases, and an introduction to using 
epidemiological records in the "administrative guidance in the control of infectious 
8 Frost, W.H. (1925), Lecture Notes, Epidemiology I: 1925 Statistics, Johns Hopkins University 
Archives, Wade Hampton Frost Papers, Box 65, 1925–1930.
9 Frost, W.H. (1920), Frost’s outline for Organization of a Department of Epidemiology, 1920, Johns 
Hopkins University Archives, Wade Hampton Frost Papers, Box 7.
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diseases."10 The lectures, which according to Fee enjoyed great popularity among 
students, were accompanied by laboratory experiments as well as field studies (Fee, 
2016, p. 134). Medical officers-in-training were encouraged to study data collected 
from ongoing outbreaks of poliomyelitis or the common cold, to apply analytical 
instruments, to develop strategies of prevention and containment, and to learn best 
practice of statistical methods. Each student developed fieldwork with the local 
authorities in Baltimore, using case data about prevalent infectious diseases while 
conducting sanitary surveys within the city. Frost stressed from the outset that a suc-
cessful epidemiological department would rely on extensive ties with institutions 
outside of the university, as well as on strong collaboration across the university and 
especially with the Johns Hopkins Hospital. Such collaboration was not merely an 
effort to prevent duplication of "effort and expense, but more largely because of a 
sincere belief in the principle of interdepartmental cooperation."11
Many historians have focused on the development of epidemiology in the after-
math of the success of the medical sciences in the late nineteenth century, particu-
larly with regards to bacteriology. Frost, like many of his contemporaries, thought of 
the relationship between pathogens and hosts as one of “seeds and soil,”12 empha-
sising, as Worboys suggested for the development of germ theories at large, their 
mutual dependency (Worboys 2000). However, Frost thought of this binary relation-
ship within the context of environmental factors, which might determine suscepti-
bility of the host (soil) and impact on the virulence of the pathogen (seed). Antici-
pating, what post-war epidemiologists began to frame as the epidemiological triad, 
Frost’s conceptualisation of epidemiological reasoning was strictly dedicated to the 
interrelations of agent, host and environment. He was acutely aware of the poten-
tial narrowing of the disciplines scope, as bacteriology’s “powerful new methods 
of identifying the causes of diseases” threatened to shift the focus away from more 
complex explanatory models and invited a new concern with specific pathogens and 
their control in epidemiology (Fee, 2016). A programmatic statement of a confer-
ence on Epidemiology, organised by Frost at Johns Hopkins University in 1927 
defined thus the “science of epidemiology” to be concerned with the “natural history 
of disease as it is expressed in groups of persons related by some common factor of 
age, sex, race, location, or occupation as distinct from the development of disease in 
individuals.” Contributing to the understanding of the mode of distribution, the aeti-
ology, possible treatment and practices of prevention, would require the “application 
of at least the following associated sciences and arts. Clinical and laboratory diag-
nosis: (the practice of medicine and public health, bacteriology and immunity), Col-
lection, tabulation, and analysis of morbidity and mortality reports: (Vital statistics, 
demography, biometry), Correlation of external environment (sanitary science), and 
11 Frost, W.H. (1920), Frost’s outline for Organization of a Department of Epidemiology, 1920, Johns 
Hopkins University Archives, Wade Hampton Frost Papers, Box 7.
12 Frost, W.H. (1931), Frost Lecture on Epidemic Theory 1930, March  9th, 1931, Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Archives, Wade Hampton Frost Papers, Box 60.
10 Frost, W.H. (1920), Frost’s outline for Organization of a Department of Epidemiology, 1920, Johns 
Hopkins University Archives, Wade Hampton Frost Papers, Box 7.
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internal environment (Parasitology) of man with the development and prevention of 
disease.”13 It was Frost’s explicit ambition to establish epidemiology as a nothing 
less but a generalist science.
Krieger’s comprehensive historical overview of the field acknowledges its inter-
sections with other scientific developments, as epidemiologists grappled with the 
“welter of epidemiology, clinical and laboratory evidence about infectious diseases." 
(Krieger, 2011, p. 97) To combine these fields and to apply them evenly to the infer-
ence of epidemiological knowledge was not always successful. Some epidemiolo-
gists appeared to be overly invested in the translation of biological principles into the 
more complex dynamic of infectious diseases, others remained attached to eugenics 
and its focus on how societal conditions, particularly the economic status of individ-
uals, shape health outcomes (Krieger, 2012, p. 647). Heesterbeck describes a schism 
in the field since the late nineteenth century, as causal theories were either derived 
from the infective power of the organism or from the susceptibility of a population 
(Heesterbeek, 2005, p. 85). The question was, how to define the field’s specific sci-
entific status, if it were not aligned as a secondary science to either the authority of 
the bacteriological laboratory or to spurious claims about population fitness (Paras-
candola, 1998).
Amsterdamska has shown for the UK that epidemiologists between 1890 and 
World War I remained indeed "relatively uninterested" in the epistemic offerings 
of the laboratory (Amsterdamska, 2005, p. 21). Bacteriology did not offer deep 
insights into most of the questions epidemiologists were asking. The identification 
of a pathogen did not illuminate the structure of prevalence rates, nor did it allow 
inferences about the spaces and locales and the social conditions of outbreaks. How-
ever, the field’s “continuous involvement with the politics and practice of public 
health” remained also an obstacle for its scientific identity (Amsterdamska, 2005, 
p. 18). To break the impasse, some epidemiologists, like John Brownlee, warmed 
to Pasteur’s suggestion of variable virulence to explain the waxing and waning of 
epidemic dynamics (Amsterdamska, 2001, p. 140). However, many epidemiologists 
safeguarded their discrete perspectives by turning instead to mathematical theorising 
to develop causal theories focused predominantly on the changing composition of 
populations.
As some have emphasized since Hacking’s The Taming of Chance, medical sta-
tistics offered the strongest set of tools with which to develop a novel and discrete 
scientific identity for the project of an academic epidemiology (Hacking, 1990). 
According to Matthews, statistics could contribute a strong "scientific self-image", 
as epidemiology expanded from empirical social science to form a strong body of 
formal analytical techniques and methods (Matthews, 1995, p. 86). Hilts emphasises 
that particularly the "biometricians gave to epidemiology a new mathematical rigor 
and the language of correlation coefficients, skew curves, and tests for the goodness 
of fit." (Hilts, 1980, p. 50) Spearheaded by Karl Pearson and translated into British 
epidemiology by Major Greenwood, biometricians forcefully argued for the almost 
13 Frost, W. H. (1927), Scope of Epidemiology, Conference on Epidemiology 1927, Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Archives, Wade Hampton Frost Paper, Box 55.
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universal application of statistical methods. Rather than just a tool to improve stand-
ards in clinical research or the bacteriological laboratory, Pearson and his collabora-
tors sought to establish statistics as an authoritative method of scientific inference 
(Porter, 1995). In particular, the application of statistical analysis to the study of 
life was to bring biological insights that neither the laboratory nor the physiologi-
cal experiment could offer. Greenwood, in a letter to Pearson, emphasized his con-
viction that indeed the laboratory and its established methods should not have any 
validity if results were not also confirmed through statistical methods:
The fact of the matter is that we are standing at the parting of the ways in med-
icine. The day is gone by when purely experimental work in either physiology 
or pathology can greatly advance knowledge. In the days of Ludwig, Claude 
Bernard and Pasteur the field was comparatively open; it is so no longer and 
the need for more rigorous logic and statistical methods of analysis must be 
realised sooner or later even by the average consultant (Greenwood, quoted in 
Matthews, 1995, p. 105).
Fortifying his own belief that epidemiological laws should be discerned and formal-
ized with mathematical accuracy, Pearson gave up quickly to convince the stubborn 
London epidemiologists of his political rationality.14 He focused instead on training 
dedicated "iatro-mathematicians", whose role was to redress medical and epidemio-
logical questions to the perspectives of biometrics, once again prioritizing the con-
sideration of population dynamics over environmental or bacteriological approaches 
(Hilts, 1980, p. 50). One of his dedicated students, among whom were renowned 
epidemiologists like Greenwood and Soper, was Raymond Pearl.
In 1917, Pearl brought Pearson’s school of thought to the US to establish popula-
tion ecology in North America (Kingsland, 2005). Pearl was invited by Welch to 
take up a new chair in vital statistics at Johns Hopkins, to elevate statistics from an 
administrative practice to an innovative research field within the School of Hygiene. 
As Fee emphasizes, Pearl, like Pearson, was eager to rethink the study of biology 
on a larger scale, integrating the analysis of populations into the understanding of 
life and death (Fee, 2016, p. 137). When Pearl joined Hopkins, he brought with 
him Lowell Reed, a tactful and discrete mathematician. While Pearl was famous for 
overbearing generalizations about the capacity of vital statistics and sported inter-
ests across the sciences and humanities, Reed was a specialists, as well as a "superb 
teacher", championing laboratory methods in statistical training (Fee, 2016, p. 139). 
Eventually, Reed succeeded in establishing a department for biometry and vital sta-
tistics in 1924, which in association with his chair set out to focus on the mathemati-
cal analysis of data about human health and disease (Fee, 2016, p. 143).
14 As a testament to the popular current of the time this rationality most often led to eugenic proposi-
tions. Confronted with a dedication to the principles of social medicine among epidemiologists, Pear-
son and Greenwood failed to convince the Epidemiological Society in London of the need to seize their 
reformist public health activities, and to accept that hereditary rather than sanitary factors were suppos-
edly behind recurring tuberculosis epidemics (Amsterdamska 2005, p. 26).
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By the mid-1920s, Reed had already made his name as an author of a series of 
mathematical theories. His name was attached to the Reed-Mettell method used to 
develop abridged life tables, as well as the Reed-Muench method, used to determine 
lethal dosages and Reed had made substantial contributions to the logistic curve as 
explanation for population growth. The biometrician, who was made full professor 
in 1925, had become an eminent figure in the formalization of population dynamics 
when he ventured into the field of public health and epidemiology (Kiser, 1966). 
Reed and Frost’s collaboration began formally in 1928 with a joint grant from the 
School of Hygiene and the School of Medicine to study the common cold and its 
relation to influenza. However, they had been close colleagues, perhaps friends, 
since as early as 1923, Fee reckoned (Fee, 2016, p. 138).
Several propositions that would later re-emerge in epidemiological modelling had 
been foundational to the field of population ecology, which both Pearl and Reed had 
advanced in the 1910s and 1920s. Their work on the logistic curve as a description 
of human and animal population growth constituted a formal and conceptual prec-
edent for the model Reed and Frost put forward a few years later. Under the assump-
tion that populations grow exponentially until reaching a limit due to lack of crucial 
resources, Pearl and Reed assumed—like Verhulst had earlier—that “the growth of a 
population decreases in linear fashion with the density of a population.”(Kingsland, 
1982, p. 32) Although the logistic curve had been fitted on American census records, 
Kingsland argued that the resulting graph was not an empirical statement, but rather 
the expression of a theoretical law—in the sense of Pearson’s statistical laws—of 
population growth. It was widely seen as radical proposition. However, the open 
question was to what extent these postulated laws about population growth incor-
porated phenomena like epidemics (Pearl & Reed, 1920). Were epidemics external 
factors that sustained deviations from the postulated regularity of the logistic curve, 
or were epidemics governed by similar principles and statistical laws and thus part 
of the equation?
An institutional association at Johns Hopkins between population ecology and 
epidemiology at that time did not come easily. The biometricians in population ecol-
ogy were known for formulaic approaches to data, eager to discern laws and patterns 
within large sets of birth and mortality statistics, census data and hospital records. 
Biometricians developed methods to infer insights from ever-larger datasets, to 
reject and revise dogma and standing hypotheses. Davenport’s studies on feeble-
mindedness in the US, as Porter has recently shown, pioneered such transformative 
inferences from larger datasets (Porter, 2018, p. 217 ff.). While biometricians had 
focused predominantly on the dynamics of populations, it would be a mistake to 
assume that epidemiologists like Frost had retreated to mono-causal explanations 
delivered by bacteriology. It would be another mistake to assume that the collabora-
tion of Reed and Frost in the development of their model had led to the integration 
of epidemiology into the field of vital statistics—as Pearson had wished for. Rather, 
Frost in his definition of epidemiology referred to “quantitative epidemiological 
descriptions” that are as important for the understanding of an epidemic, as were 
fine-grained observations and descriptions of “local environment, personal habits, 
past history, and individual traits.”(Frost, 1941, p. 496).
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Returning to Frost’s analogy of the relation between theory and descriptions as 
one associated with the diagram and the photograph, the development of the Reed-
Frost epidemic theory encapsulated a rather subtle, but important epistemological 
shift. The collaboration of the biometrician Reed and the predominantly empirically 
orientated epidemiologist, Frost, would effectively turn a descriptive practice into 
an analytical science. Without disavowing the value of observation and descrip-
tions, Frost conceded that epidemiology could not be a “purely descriptive science.” 
But to advance epidemiological theory and to develop a field that not only counts 
and maps cases but contributes to the understanding of a disease’s “nature, sources, 
means of spread, and eventually its control,” it was important to overcome the per-
sistence of simplistic causal theories and to replace them with analytical approaches 
(Frost, 1941, p. 497).
In line with this approach, the Reed-Frost epidemic theory was geared towards 
the correlation of interdependent variables, rather than to investigate single culprits 
for an epidemic outbreak. The mechanical model embodied a departure from dec-
ades of deterministic haggling between explanatory models, where bacteriologists 
had prioritised the pathogen, where vital statisticians—like Reed—had focused 
on populations and where traditional sanitarians and field epidemiologists—like 
Frost—remained concerned with the environment. Reed and Frost’s mechanized 
“diagram” found its central purpose in drawing apart persisting causal theories, 
merging research conventions and disciplinary approaches, while offering a versatile 
teaching instrument to develop a new practice of analytic epidemic theory.
4  Making a model science
As Fine reports in the 1970s, the model quickly became a staple in discussions 
among epidemiologists in the 1940s. It was adapted and developed in departments 
across the US, and was the subject of a long series of interpretative, extending and 
revising publications (Abbey, 1952; Fine, 1977). Some recent publication continue 
to position the model as the origin of a history of “mechanistic modelling” in public 
health (Lessler & Cummings, 2016; Phillips, 2021). Without a doubt, the Reed-Frost 
epidemic theory became a cornerstone for a budding tradition of building models 
in epidemiology since the 1920s. In its mechanical simplicity, equipped just with a 
box, a trough, and coloured marbles the model dissolved disciplinary boundaries, 
while offering a new way to theorize the dynamics of infectious diseases.
Morgan reminds us in her history of modelling in economics that modelling and 
mathematical proofing are different styles of reasoning. Morgan considers the mak-
ing of models a discrete epistemic genre, "a practical mode of reasoning to gain 
knowledge about the economic world."(Morgan, 2012, p. 18) As such, in econom-
ics—as well as in epidemiology—a style of reasoning dedicated to modelling has 
proliferated with the support of mathematical approaches, but should not be seen as 
identical with it. Where the mathematical formula postulated and described general 
laws of epidemic distribution, making a physical model enabled a different approach 
to the exploration and experimental denotation of aspects of epidemiology. Morgan 
hence suggests a strong focus on the modalities of model objects to comprehend 
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how the mechanical construction of models and working with physical models 
might have shaped scientific practice.
Making models requires different degrees of formalisation. Reed and Frost devel-
oped a mathematical expression for the characteristics they inferred from vital statis-
tics (Reed) and which had been observed in epidemics on the ground (Frost). Abbey 
assumes their formula to have been heavily influenced by Soper’s work. In the early 
1920s, Soper postulated a hypothetical community in which susceptibility to dis-
ease and the capacity to transmit disease was of equal power to all individuals and 
delivered a mathematical equation which fitted roughly to real-world measles out-
breaks (Soper, 1929). Soper assumed that the transmission of disease within a popu-
lation ultimately followed a similar dynamics as “the law of mass-actions” among 
chemical molecules, according to which “the numbers of cases infected by one 
case is proportional to the number of susceptibles in the community.”(Soper, cited 
in Heesterbeek, 2005, p. 97) As Abbey points out, Reed and Frost took issue with 
the assumption of a perpetual flow of cases, governed by the number of susceptible 
individuals and considered this to be a critical oversight in Soper’s equation. Their 
question was, how could the dynamic of an epidemic be modelled so that it took 
into account more than the changing ratios of a population, of the distribution of 
infectious, susceptible and immune individuals? Moving beyond the population as 
the predominant focus of mathematical approaches to epidemiological phenomena, 
their model was supposed to allow for experimental engagement with the factors 
that contributed for an infection to occur in between individuals. They turned thus to 
the question of contact.
Reed and Frost had designed their model first of all to allow for active cases to 
only infect susceptible individuals which were in direct contact within a time period. 
To achieve this modification, they turned to the urn and marbles, the standard mod-
elling inventory of probabilistic reasoning since Bernoulli (Hacking, 1990, p. 101). 
In its basic form it was used to infer the probability of a ratio of differently coloured 
marbles based on a variable number of drawings from the urn. Using and adapting 
this mechanical instrument emphasised that all epidemics are to some extent gov-
erned by elements of chance. Reed and Frost, however, used the urn as a randomiser 
to then simulate the ongoing outbreak in the trough. While the marbles continued to 
represent the population and its changing ratio in an epidemic, the trough assumed 
the position of a time-period in which the marbles come into a structured contact—a 
single file—with each other.
Through the use of such coloured marbles, Krieger argues, a specific statistical 
understanding of population has come to be established in epidemiological reason-
ing. The hypothetical population of marbles in a box is void of intrinsic relations and 
disavows inferences between individual risks and population patterns. While such 
models might determine chances for individuals to catch a disease, it cannot ever 
determine which individual, or marble, will become a case. However, a physical 
model, so Krieger argues, still affords the epidemiologist a valuable visualisation of 
“structured chances.” (Krieger, 2012) Combining an instrument of randomization, 
such as the box in which the marbles are mixed, with a trough, in which the marbles 
form a pattern, enhanced an understanding of epidemics as phenomena shaped both 
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by the changing ratio of a population as well as by structures that arise from multi-
ple causal processes governing infection.
Devices like the mechanical analogue to the Reed-Frost epidemic theory there-
fore forcefully demonstrated that neither the innate qualities found in a population or 
the specific capacities of a pathogen were assumed to govern epidemics, but that the 
structural—or environmental—forces governing their interaction were just as signif-
icant. As Abbey in her commentary on the model has pointed out, a key advantage 
of the mechanical analogue was to prioritise the question of “adequate contact.” The 
models was predicated on the assumption that only susceptible individuals coming 
into contact with a case would yield to an infection. Susceptible marbles lying before 
and after an infected marble would become infected. Their status would last for one 
time period before the individual acquired immunity. For all susceptible individu-
als in the marble population there is thus a dynamic probability of “coming into 
adequate contact” with an infected marble, depending on where each marble lands 
in the single file in the trough within one time period. “Adequate contact” was thus 
understood as a stand-in for all possible factors determining the actual transmission 
of an infectious disease within a population. Abbey argued:
The probability of contact, in this sense, depends on the susceptibility or 
resistance of the host, the infectivity of the parasite, the length of exposure 
and size of dose necessary to produce the disease, as well as the environmental 
conditions for the transfer of the organism. (Abbey, 1952, p. 205)
From Morgan’s work, it follows that a model, like the result of the Reed-Frost col-
laboration, allows for development of an experimental scientific inquiry that consid-
ers not only isolated aspects of epidemiological problems, but aims to contribute 
to the development of general theory. As the model becomes itself a representation 
of the principles that undergird epidemics, it begins to constitute what an epidemic 
ought to be. A general theory not only explains individual outbreaks to answer ques-
tions of the who, what and when of a specific disease in a particular location. Rather, 
it introduces the hypothetical epidemic as an object of enquiry, or—with Daston 
and Galison as a “working object,”—around which the practice of epidemiological 
research is assembled and from which the world of epidemics can be envisioned. 
How then did the Reed-Frost epidemic theory define what epidemics are and how 
epidemiology was supposed to study them?
In 1928, while lecturing at Harvard, Frost had offered further background 
to the ideas, which led to the collaborative development of the model. Firstly, 
developing a new general theory required rejecting that "epidemics originated de 
novo."(Frost, 1976, p. 141) Since specific infectious pathogens had been iden-
tified it was no longer tenable to assume that each epidemic outbreak bore no 
resemblance to any previous one. This acknowledgement resulted in a new quest 
to identify the factors for the waxing and waning of epidemics, and to explain 
why epidemics seem to follow rhythms similar to the development of certain ani-
mal populations. The first explanation, many turned to across the nineteenth cen-
tury, assumed that "prevalence of an infectious disease was strictly proportion-
ate to the chance of contact." Epidemic spread was attributed in principle to the 
environment and to circumstances favouring the distribution of a pathogen (Frost, 
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1976, p. 141). Second, many bacteriologists had long argued that dynamics of 
epidemics adhered to the variability in the infective "properties of specific micro-
organisms," replacing older views that considered infectivity to be an inflexible 
characteristic of bacteria (Frost, 1976, p. 143). Third, the susceptibility of host 
organisms, as detailed by immunologists, were also subject to variation in rela-
tion to a range of factors, some directly connected to previous infections or to 
their habitat (for example in tropical diseases). Frost wrote:
The known differences between different diseases as regards variability of 
the specific microorganism, its period of survival in the individual host, the 
ratio of subclinical to clinical infections, the character and distribution of 
natural host resistance, the degree and durability of acquired immunity, and 
the kind of conditions necessary for conveyance from host to host—all these 
are sufficient to account for the widest differences in periodicity and range 
of epidemics in different diseases; and we can hardly expect to discover 
any simple and general law which will take account of all these variables. 
(Frost, 1976, p. 151)
According to Frost in 1928, none of the traditional building blocks of epidemio-
logical arguments, not the environment, nor variable virulence in pathogens or 
the vulnerability of populations offered a stable foundation to draw causal infer-
ences on the dynamics of epidemics. Frost’s elaborations suggest a conceptual 
gestation of what MacMahon and Pugh would frame in post-war epidemiology 
as the epidemiological triad: while agent, host and environment were implicated 
in the dynamics of an epidemic, causal inferences could no longer meaningful 
attributed to one of these building blocks of epidemiological reasoning. Any 
inference needed to consider the web of causation, in which each factor might 
impact on each other one (MacMahon & Pugh, 1971).
One key observation by Frost was that complex interdependencies seemed to 
be at work among these three discrete factors: environmental aspects might have 
influence on the infectivity of the pathogen and the susceptibility of the host; 
population behaviour could change the intensity of environmental circumstances; 
and passage through host bodies affected the virulence of infectious agents. Frost 
concluded that:
Each of these factors is subject to many and complex variations, which we 
can recognize as possibilities, and which we may demonstrate as realities, 
but which we can measure only imperfectly under natural conditions with 
our present means of observation. (Frost, 1976, p. 144)
What a formal language could offer, and what the Reed-Frost epidemic theory 
materialised in its mechanical analogue, was to "bring into view the different var-
iables which may be concerned in determining the course of epidemics, to indi-
cate in a general way how these may interact; and to call attention to the present 
gaps in our knowledge and imperfections in our means of observation."(Frost, 
1976, p. 142) Importantly, this statement should not be misunderstood as a call 
for improved empirical measures. Instead, the model and its theory were intended 
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to do nothing less but to define a new theoretical foundation for the epidemic as 
an open-ended object of research, characterised by interdependence and causal 
uncertainty. Rather than to define a general rate and scope of for the epidemic 
prevalence of a disease or to set arbitrary norms to separate endemic from epi-
demic states, Frost proposed to think of the epidemic as a temporary increase in 
prevalence, which indicates to the observer not more and not less than "a defi-
nite change in the balance of forces controlling the occurrence of the disease in 
the population."(Frost, 1976, p. 143) Rather than to conceptualize an epidemic 
through the consideration of cause and effect, Frost suggested in 1928 an epide-
miological reasoning concerned with association and correlation; a thinking that 
is usually attributed to Austin Bradford Hill’s post-war work in non-communica-
ble diseases (Berlivet, 2005).
Reed and Frost sought to emphasise interdependent variation instead of individ-
ual causes and to position epidemiology firmly as a science concerned with variable 
relations that controlled the waxing and waning of epidemic phenomena. With this 
definition, which Frost later also expanded to chronic disorders, epidemics ceased to 
be rare, exceptional events, but became phenomena characteristic of the fluctuations, 
oscillations and intervals stemming from the interplay between disease, environment 
and host population. The model achieved this iconoclasm through a subtle but cru-
cial shift in focus. While most mathematical approaches to epidemics at the time 
had been predominantly concerned with the ratio of the population, Reed and Frost 
moved the focus of their mechanical model to the question of “adequate contact.” 
Their modelling thus substantiated an epidemiological reasoning, in which the cause 
for an epidemic could no longer be attributed to either the population, the pathogen 
or the environment but only to the conditions and structural forces that governed 
their interaction.
5  Conclusion
As epidemiology became an academic department at Johns Hopkins, the field 
assumed a new identity as an analytical science. Proponents of epidemiology sought 
to establish the field as a science firmly oriented towards open-ended analysis of 
data from an equally open-ended range of data sources and to be applied to an 
increasingly open-ended range of phenomena. As the history of the Reed-Frost epi-
demic theory shows, this endeavour required a novel combination of descriptive and 
analytical methods, rather than the abolishment of empirical principles in the name 
of formalisation.
As the field of epidemiology was elevated to an academic discipline, epidemi-
ologists began to invest in the production of their own, discrete theorization of epi-
demics as a research and as a working object. Turning epidemiological reasoning 
towards an analytical focus required the definition and representation of a research 
object in general terms and to subsume the study of increasingly complex infectious 
(and later chronic) diseases under one disciplinary umbrella. Where the epidemiolo-
gists’ fieldwork observed the sheer infinite range of detail on the "epidemic streets", 
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the epidemiologists’ lab-work and theoretical dedication now required a considera-
tion of the proposed laws of epidemics through mechanistic models.
To understand the driver of a measles outbreak, for example, knowledge about 
household composition, rates of contact between children in a school or members 
of a community needed to be considered on the ground and within the local con-
text. As Frost never grew tired to emphasize, this local configuration of an epidemic 
could not be approached, nor understood through models or mathematical abstrac-
tion, but demanded an approach in which observation and open-ended interest 
would prevail. Mathematical formalization and models, on the other hand, were not 
designed to define general laws with which one would understand the contingent 
space of a measles outbreak in a school. But models sought to provide students with 
a representation of the dynamics and relations that constitute the epidemic as an 
object of research to draw attention to the multiple, interdependent factors that drive 
any (measles) outbreak. In short, considering the model helped to prevent simplistic 
attributions for the outbreak to either a ‘weak’ population, or a particularly infec-
tious virus, or just to specific sanitary conditions.
While some epidemiologists had begun to reconsider the interdependence 
between hosts and pathogens elsewhere, the mechanical analogue to the Reed-Frost 
epidemic theory offered a novel representation of the dynamics of epidemics as sys-
tems of balance and equilibrium. Thinking the epidemic through the model enabled 
a kind of agnosticism towards any causal theory, which were offered by physiology, 
eugenics, bacteriology or clinical medicine. Instead, the model diverted focus away 
from the identification of causality and established a system of thinking in which 
epidemics were neither a foreign invasion, nor an indication of sudden disruption. 
Instead, the model implied for an epidemic—even if it was associated with an iden-
tifiable infectious pathogen—to be merely a quantitative variation of otherwise nor-
mal circumstances. Perhaps most significantly, the mechanistic model also enabled 
the theorization of contagion beyond the concept of discernible pathogens. How and 
it what way such modelling supported the expansion of epidemiological reasoning 
into other domains and how it advanced the conceptualisation of contagious phe-
nomena in sociology, economics and psychiatry, particularly in the post-war period, 
shall be subject of follow-on research.
Mechanistic modelling with SIR parameters has become the standard instrument 
to evaluate outbreaks and to predict potential disasters, particularly when data and 
observations are sparse. This history of the Reed-Frost epidemic theory draws atten-
tion to two aspects that are rarely considered when discussing the sudden authority 
and pervasive impact of modelling in the response to COVID-19. First, mechanis-
tic modelling has for almost a hundred years determined how epidemiologists have 
theorized and analysed infectious diseases. The Reed-Frost epidemic theory has not 
assumed its position due to its capacity to accurately predict epidemic curves, nor 
due to its applicability to real-world outbreaks. Instead, the model’s pivotal position 
derives from instigating a shift in thinking, enabling the theorizing and conceptual-
ising of epidemics “sui generis,” and by considering the dynamic conditions under 
which “adequate contact” between agent, environment and population might gov-
ern the dynamics of an epidemic outbreak. Second, this history emphasises the out-
standing significance of such modelling in the modern history of epidemiology, and 
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particularly in infectious disease research and education. However, this history also 
shows that models have not always been the intractable and opaque black boxes, as 
they appear today; their history as pedagogical instruments implies a shifting posi-
tion of models and modelling in epidemiological practice since the 1920s. Questions 
need to be raised how a working object used to exemplify theoretical approaches 
in epidemiology has advanced into a fetishized point of convergence in the digital 
world, imbued with opaque academic hierarchies, shielded by technological bounda-
ries but nonetheless equipped with authority over significant policy decisions.
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